Support for Diem continued to erode within South Vietnam, and it wasn’t helped by the leader’s unpopular domestic agriculture policies. By 1963, his hold over power in South Vietnam was so tenuous that he was ultimately overthrown (and assassinated) by some of his own generals in a move reportedly sanctioned by the administration of President John F. Kennedy, which had already sent military advisors to the country to support homegrown forces.
President Kennedy was himself assassinated a few weeks later and his successor, Johnson, believed that the only way to stem the losses suffered by South Vietnamese troops was to increase U.S. military presence in the region.
William Westmoreland
By this time, U.S. forces were already engaged in bombing campaigns on the border of Vietnam and Laos (with the intention of disrupting supply transport to North Vietnamese troops) and supporting the South Vietnamese in raids of Viet Cong strongholds in rural areas of the country.
In the summer of 1964, with U.S. naval support, the South Vietnamese began a coordinated series of commando raids along the North Vietnamese coast. In July, at the advice of Lieutenant General William Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, the focus of these attacks shifted from commando raids on land to shoreline bombardments using mortars and rockets.
These actions on the shores of the Gulf of Tonkin were conducted with U.S. naval destroyers stationed nearby—hence, the presence of Maddox and Turner Joy, which were also there on reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering missions.
U.S.S. Maddox
In the early morning hours of August 2, 1964, the crew of Maddox received an intelligence report suggesting that three North Vietnamese patrol boats had been dispatched to attack it.
The naval ship’s captain, John J. Herrick, initially ordered Maddox to head out to sea, hoping to avoid confrontation. However, a few hours later, Herrick reversed his orders, and the destroyer returned to the Gulf.
Within a few hours, three North Vietnamese patrol boats were fast approaching the destroyer, and Herrick ordered the ship’s guns to be at the ready. He told his crew to be prepared to fire if the patrol boats came within 10,000 yards of Maddox. He also called in air support from the U.S.S. Ticonderoga, which was stationed nearby.
Maddox and the fighter jets were able to fend off the North Vietnamese attack, and the three boats retreated—one boat was destroyed and the other two were heavily damaged.
Gulf of Tonkin Incident
The next day, in a demonstration of American resolve, President Johnson ordered Turner Joy to join Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin. On August 4, Maddox and Turner Joy both received intelligence suggesting that another North Vietnamese attack was imminent.
With visibility poor and storms approaching, Captain Herrick ordered the destroyers to take evasive measures to avoid confrontation, by moving further out to sea.
Just before 9 p.m. that night, Maddox reported spotting unidentified vessels in the area. Over the next three hours, Maddox and Turner Joy were engaged in high-speed maneuvers designed to evade attack, although it was unclear whether or not North Vietnamese ships were in fact in pursuit.
Still, Maddox reported multiple torpedo attacks as well as automatic weapons fire. Both destroyers returned fire, launching multiple shells at the “enemy.”
However, Navy Commander James Stockdale, who had overseen the air defense of Maddox two days before and was flying reconnaissance over the Gulf of Tonkin on August 4th, cast doubt on whether there was indeed an attack that day, noting, “Our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets… There were no [North Vietnamese] boats there… There was nothing there but black water and American firepower.”
Captain Herrick, too, later questioned his crew’s version of events and attributed their actions on August 4th to “overeager sonar operators” and crew member error.