When it comes to the World Cup tournament, host nations have long used the event as a giant diversionary tool. Whether the economy is sagging (South Africa), corruption scandals are raging (Brazil) or world bodies have levied sanctions in response to illegal interventions (Russia), the festivities can serve as a handy public-relations veil to mask unpalatable geopolitical truths. And it’s hardly a recent phenomenon: The World Cup has been a favorite plaything of politicians for decades, and perhaps never so much as the 1978 version, held in Argentina.
When that tournament kicked off in June 1978, Argentina was in the thick of its bloody military dictatorship, often referred to as the Dirty War. It began just over two years earlier when the country’s military leaders arrested the democratically elected president, Isabel Perón, and installed General Jorge Rafael Videla.
A severe authoritarian with cold staring eyes, Videla was not a fan of soccer, which he found dull and pedestrian and interesting only as a “symbol of popular transcendence.” He rarely, if ever, watched the sport. But he also understood how immensely popular it was, a source of passion for millions of Argentines and for countless more around the world. Just hours after taking power—with the South American nation under martial law and a curfew, its Congress closed and all unions suspended—Videla and the other military leaders who planned the coup found time to discuss the World Cup.
Hosting rights to the tournament had been awarded to Argentina more than a decade earlier, but Videla and his closest confidants recognized it as a key instrument for maintaining their power and putting down dissent. With a deeply troubled economy suffering under inflation rates topping 300% and armed opposition from leftist guerrillas known as Montoneros, winning popular support at home and abroad was seen as critical for ensuring stability.
Beating back international critics
“Holding the tournament will show the world that Argentina is a trustworthy country, capable of carrying out huge projects,” advised Admiral Emilio Massera. “And it will help push back against the criticism that is raining on us from around the world.”
Within weeks, the military junta, ignoring concerns that the costs of the tournament could bankrupt the country, officially designated the World Cup a matter of “national interest.” And despite rules from FIFA, soccer’s international governing body, mandating that national governments not be directly involved in organizing the tournament, the Junta created a new entity run by high-ranking officers that would manage the task under military supervision. Videla, intent on holding the power he had stolen, was not going to leave anything to chance.
In the wake of the coup, international condemnation of the junta had been growing more strident; in Europe in particular, critical voices grew increasingly louder.
Disappearances in Argentina were increasingly common, with a growing number of intellectuals, artists, teachers and even professional athletes being picked up by government agents, never to be heard from again. Over several years, an astonishing 18 members of the La Plata Rugby Club, some of whom were known to hold left-wing political beliefs, were disappeared and never seen alive again. And all the while, a heavily censored press blamed everything on vaguely defined “terrorists,” who were the alleged enemies of the Argentine public and had to be stopped at all costs.